Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and Individuals: Lessons From Abroad by Rutledge, Peter B. & Howard, Anna W.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2010
Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and
Individuals: Lessons From Abroad
Peter B. Rutledge
University of Georgia Law School, borut@uga.edu
Anna W. Howard
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Peter B. Rutledge and Anna W. Howard, Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and Individuals: Lessons From Abroad , 65 Disp. Resol.
J. 30 (2010),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1239
30 F E B R U A R Y / A P R I L  2 0 1 0
The authors surveyed the approaches of four European coun-
tries, Canada and Australia to determine the accuracy of
the U.S. perception that foreign countries ban all pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in the consumer and
employment contexts. They find no such bans in
the countries surveyed. This finding casts
doubt on the argument that Congress
should adopt the Arbitration Fairness
Act in order to bring the United
States into alignment with for-
eign countries. Accordingly,
the authors recommend
that Congress consider
the surveyed foreign
models before voting
on this bill.
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Arbitrating Disputes   Between
Lessons from Abroad
A
N
D
ongress presently is considering
the most significant overhaul of
arbitration law in the United
States since the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act’s (FAA) enactment in 1925.
This follows many previous efforts in
recent years to introduce bills that
would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in contracts of various kinds,
including those pertaining to consumer
purchases, terms of employment, live-
stock/poultry, franchises, motor vehicle 
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sales, military reservists, nursing home admis-
sions, and home mortgages.1 A central premise
underlying these bills is the idea that the parties
to these agreements (typically there is an individ-
ual on one side and a company on the other) tend
to occupy unequal bargaining positions. The
drafters of these bills conclude from this that the
individual’s choice to opt into arbitration before a
dispute has arisen cannot be considered free and
voluntary, and thus, the arbitration agreement
should be considered void and unenforceable.
Defenders of these bills claim
that the United States, when
compared to other nations,
stands alone in allowing pre-dis-
pute agreements between com-
panies and individuals to be
enforced.2 But is that true? We
set out to test this claim in order
to determine whether U.S. poli-
cy makers can learn anything
from their foreign counter-
parts.3 Our research indicates
that the treatment of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements in
other nations is not as portrayed
by proponents of these bills,
suggesting that Congress should
take these other approaches into
consideration before rushing to
adopt purported reforms.
Arbitration at Home
Until the early 20th century,
questions over the enforceability
of arbitration agreements be-
tween companies and individuals
simply did not arise. Prior to the
enactment of the FAA in 1925, pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements largely were unenforceable.4
In the immediate decades following the FAA’s
enactment, arbitration agreements between indi-
viduals and companies received greater judicial
acceptance, but it was far from complete. The
FAA’s requirement that arbitration agreements be
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract” enabled courts to enforce some agreements
between companies and individuals involving
routine contract claims. Courts also would en-
force arbitration clauses contained in collective
bargaining agreements (the underlying rationale
being that the labor union could effectively rep-
resent the interests of its members and, thereby,
effectively counterbalance the company’s bar-
gaining position).5 Yet the “nonarbitrability doc-
trine”—which precluded arbitration of many
claims arising under federal statutes—effectively
protected individuals from having to arbitrate
certain disputes with companies.6
The decline of this doctrine in the 1980s ex-
panded the opportunities to use arbitration claus-
es in contracts between companies and individu-
als. Beginning in that decade, the U.S. Supreme
Court increasingly enforced arbitration agree-
ments in disputes arising under federal statutes.
In quick succession, it permitted arbitration of
claims under the federal securities and employ-
ment discrimination laws and,
indeed, overruled an early non-
arbitrability decision.7
While early efforts to undo
this pro-arbitrability jurispru-
dence received little support,
more measured legislative efforts
have succeeded. In the last seven
years, Congress has passed legis-
lation barring the enforcement
of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments in contracts between credit
card companies and military per-
sonnel, between poultry whole-
salers and farmers, and between
automobile manufacturers and
dealers (although President
Obama has just signed legislation
permitting this kind of arbitra-
tion8). An underlying premise of
these enactments was that they
were necessary to counteract the
company’s unfair bargaining
position in the arbitration agree-
ments.
The success of these incre-
mental changes has sparked a re-
newed interest in a more comprehensive ban on
enforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between companies and individuals. The boldest
effort, the bill called the Arbitration Fairness Act,
would retroactively invalidate pre-dispute agree-
ments in employment, consumer, and franchise
agreements.9 Defenders of this bill argue that its
enactment would bring the United States into
line with other industrialized nations which, so
the argument goes, categorically prohibit arbitra-
tion in these contexts.10 The next section exam-
ines the validity of this claim.
Arbitration Abroad
To test the proposition that, of all the industri-
alized nations, only the United States allows arbi-
tration of disputes between companies and indi-
viduals, we examined European Union law as well
as the arbitration laws of four European countries
32 F E B R U A R Y / A P R I L  2 0 1 0
The authors set
out to test the
proposition
that, of all the
industrialized
nations, only
the United
States allows
arbitration 
of disputes
between com-
panies and
individuals.
(the United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Switzerland) and two non-European countries
(Canada and Australia). We recognize that the
choice of countries is somewhat arbitrary.
Nonetheless, the countries we selected represent
both common law and civil law traditions, and are
among the most important arbitral forums in the
world. We included European law because of its
increasing importance and influence in both the
consumer and employment fields.
European Council Directive 93/13
In 1993, the European Community (EC) passed
Directive 93/13 which provides for a consumer
protection scheme within the European Union.11
Article 3(1) of this directive sets out the definition
of an unfair contractual term in consumer con-
tracts. It states, “[a] contractual term which has not
been individually negotiated shall be regarded as
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good
faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the par-
ties’ rights and obligations arising under the con-
tract, to the detriment of the consumer.”
The annex to the directive states that a con-
sumer arbitration clause that makes arbitration
the exclusive remedy meets the definition of an
“unfair term” in Article 3(1). But, because the
legislation is in the form of a directive as opposed
to a resolution, the European Council only re-
quires Member States to institute domestic poli-
cies that are harmonious with the directive.
Therefore, Member States do not have to follow
the directive exactly as it is written.12 Rather,
“[d]irectives bind EU members to the stated
goals, but the countries achieve directive purpos-
es by changing their own laws, leaving wiggle
room on compliance.”13 The following European
countries, three of which are EU Member States
and one of which is not but often adopts EU reg-
ulations, have implemented this directive in their
own way, as seen below.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) overhauled its
consumer arbitration regulations in 1999 when it
implemented EC Directive 93/13, the European
Community’s directive on consumer contracts.14
Known as the “Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999,” the U.K. regula-
tions control all contractual relations between
consumers and businesses. They contain a “non-
exhaustive list of the terms which may be regard-
ed as unfair and includes arbitration among
them.”15 The term “consumer” is broadly defined
to include any “natural person who is acting for
purposes outside his trade, business, or profes-
sion.”16 It also lists a few circumstances in which
a contractual term (including one referring dis-
putes exclusively to arbitration) will be regarded
as unfair.17 One of these circumstances involves a
contract term that is imposed on the other party
with no opportunity to negotiate it. Thus, the
regulations say: “A contractual term which has
not been individually negotiated shall be regard-
ed as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”
Another circumstance suggesting unfairness is
when the contract terms are boilerplate provi-
sions, drafted before the current transaction.
Thus, the regulations say: “A term shall always be
regarded as not having been individually negoti-
ated where it has been drafted in advance and the
consumer has therefore not been able to influ-
ence the substance of the term.”18
Additionally, the regulations place the burden
on the seller to prove that a term was individually
negotiated.19 While the U.K. does place a restric-
tion on the ability to contract pre-dispute for
arbitration—namely that the arbitration clause
must be negotiated for—it does not go so far as
to make every pre-dispute arbitration agreement
in a consumer contract void.
In the U.K., the arbitrability of employment
claims is affected by the nature of the action—
whether it is statutory or based on a private obli-
gation. If arbitration is required by a private
employment agreement, the matter is subject to
the U.K. arbitration statute (Arbitration Act,
1996), which makes such agreements enforceable,
thereby providing a basis for arbitrability. If,
however, the plaintiff sues under statutory
employment protections, the matter can be arbi-
trated via the Advisory, Conciliation and Ar-
bitration Service (ACAS) scheme, referred to in
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Section 7(1) of the Employment Rights (Dispute
Resolution) Act of 1998 (abbreviated as the
ER(DR)A 1998).20 This scheme allows parties to
avoid employment tribunals and to agree to arbi-
tration after the dispute has arisen.21
France
France has also implemented EC Directive
91/13 through Article 132-1 of the Code de la con-
sommation [France’s Consumer Code]. This pro-
vision states: “any clause in a contract concluded
between a seller or a supplier and a person who is
not acting in the course of his trade, business or
profession or a consumer shall be regarded as
unfair if its object or effect is to create, to the
detriment of that person or consumer, a signifi-
cant imbalance in the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract.”22 The provision fur-
ther states in the annex that an arbitration clause
may be statutorily unfair but it is the plaintiff’s
obligation to prove this.23
The bottom line is that France provides some
protections for consumers against unfair arbitra-
tion provisions but it puts the burden on them to
prove that the provision is unfair. 
The ability to arbitrate employment law claims
in France depends upon whether the employer
still actively employs the employee when the
arbitration was commenced.24 While employed,
the Counseils des Prud’hommes—i.e., employment
tribunals—have exclusive jurisdiction over em-
ployment disputes and their authority cannot be
bypassed.25 But once an employee is fired or
quits, the French Code du Travail allows the
employer and employee to arbitrate their claims
because the employee is no longer economically
reliant on the employer.26
Germany
The German implementation of EC Directive
93/13 is found in Sections 305-310 of the Ger-
man Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or
BGB).27 Section 307 BGB governs the unfairness
of contract terms. Marco Ardizzoni has described
the unfairness test as one of good faith: “In es-
sence the unfairness test of Section 307 para-
graphs 1-2 BGB requires that the interests of the
user are balanced against the objective interests
of the other contracting party. Subjective circum-
stances in any particular case usually will not be
taken into account.”28 He goes on to say that
Section 310(3) requires the “specific circum-
stances accompanying the conclusion of a con-
sumer contract” to be taken into consideration in
applying the unfairness test under Section 307.29
Other German laws can also apply to con-
sumer arbitration agreements. German consumer
law, Ardizzoni says, allows arbitration clauses to
be implemented pre-dispute but requires them to
be written in an “intelligible and transparent
manner.” “Unclear or nonunderstandable terms”
have been held to violate the good faith require-
ment of Section 307(1).30
German arbitration law imposes strict form
requirements on cases in which consumers are
involved. Section 1031(5) of the German Civil
Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) generally requires
that the arbitration agreement be contained in a
separate and mutually signed document that solely
contains the agreement to arbitrate.31
In Germany, employers and employees can
agree to arbitrate under Sections 101 et seq. of
the German Labour Courts Act (ArbGG), but
they are required to use a “separate system of
arbitral proceedings”32 found in Sections 103-110
ArbGG. In particular, Section 103(1) ArbGG pro-
vides that an employment arbitral tribunal must
be composed of an equal number of workers and
employers. Impartial persons can act as additional
arbitrators.
Switzerland
Switzerland allows any claim involving an “eco-
nomic interest” to be arbitrated.33 “The courts
interpret the term ‘economic interest’ in a very
broad manner, favoring arbitrability.”34 In general,
consumer disputes are arbitrable under Swiss law
because they are not preempted by Article 22 of
the Federal Law of the Forum in Civil Matters
(Bundesgesetzes über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen
or GestG) the provision that places restrictions on
consumer disputes.35 However, there is some legal
doctrine to support the view that, due to the inter-
action of code provisions, consumer disputes are
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The varying approaches taken by the industrialized
nations surveyed here suggest that there are 
other options Congress should consider before 
taking action to change the current system.
only arbitrable under post-dispute arbitration
agreements.36 But, this is not the prevailing view.37
The arbitrability of employment disputes in
Switzerland is very similar to the arbitrability of
consumer disputes, except that Article 24 GestG
governs preemption. But, like consumer disputes,
employment disputes are arbitrable and not pre-
empted. Further, Swiss courts have specifically
held employment disputes to be arbitrable.38
Non-European Union Countries
Canada
In Canada, under federal law, parties generally
are able to contract for arbitration before any dis-
pute arises.39 Legislative limitations on the ability
to enforce pre-dispute consumer arbitration
clauses exist only in provincial law in the
provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Alberta.40 In
Ontario and Quebec, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are void in the consumer context and
cannot prevent a plaintiff from filing a class
action lawsuit or from becoming a member of a
class.41 In Alberta, the Fair Trading Act guaran-
tees access to courts, including class action proce-
dures, in respect to all causes of action under the
Act.42 In order for a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement to be enforceable under the Fair
Trading Act, it must have received ministerial
approval.43 These limitations normally mean that
a stay of litigation in favor of arbitration will not
be granted.44 But, all three provinces allow con-
sumers to agree to arbitration post-dispute.45
There is no similar prohibition on the arbitra-
bility of class actions for employment disputes.46
Australia
Australia places only one federal limitation on
the arbitrability of consumer disputes.47 That
limitation applies only to insurance benefit dis-
putes, and makes them non-arbitrable.48
By contrast, employment disputes are fully
arbitrable in a private setting. Most employment
arbitrations in Australia make use of the federal
Fair Work Australia scheme (the national work-
place relations tribunal) because it is cheaper.49
Lessons from Abroad
The foregoing survey exposes a mistaken
premise in the current reform debate in the
United States. Contrary to the statements of
some reform advocates, foreign countries do not
all categorically preclude enforcement of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements between companies
and individuals. Rather, our survey reveals a vari-
ety of approaches, ranging from the more conser-
vative approach of England, to the more tolerant
approach of Australia. These varying approaches
suggest that the U.S. Congress has a far more
diverse menu of options than simply invalidating
pre-dispute consumer and employment arbitra-
tion agreements outright, or preserving the status
quo. For example, it could follow the French
model by codifying certain procedural protec-
tions in the FAA. Alternatively, it could follow
the German model by imposing certain formality
requirements on the arbitration agreement.
Whatever policy alternative it considers, Con-
gress must keep in mind potentially salient differ-
ences between legal systems. For example, in con-
trast to the United States, many foreign countries
permit the prevailing party to recover its attor-
ney’s fees. Further, foreign countries have a more
limited regime for class action and collective liti-
gation. Most do not permit as extensive discovery
as U.S. courts do. Thus, the consequences of bar-
ring certain kinds of arbitration could have very
different effects here than they would if such a
ban were implemented abroad.
It behooves Congress to study closely the les-
sons from these nations, rather than blindly accept
unexamined claims about the foreign models that,
this article demonstrates, are simply inaccurate. It
would be unfortunate if Congress were to rush
headlong into reform without considering these
lessons from abroad and, indeed, the height of
irony if Congress were to invalidate such arbitra-
tion agreements in the belief that it was bringing
the United States into line with the systems of
other nations when, in fact, some of those very
same nations are moving more toward the
American model. n
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